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Effective engagement by communities is a crucial strategy for anti-
corruption initiatives. However, encouraging involvement and civic-
mindedness at a local level can present challenges for donors and
practitioners. Trust, the sense of ownership, and inclusion create and
strengthen participation by enabling community members to express their
opinions and expectations, and demand accountability from power holders.
Feedback plays a pivotal role in successful projects by fostering dialogue
between policymakers and citizens.
Main points
• If elites, or powerful state or local leaders, exploit the existing legal and
social order for their own benefits, corruption becomes one of the main
threats to the rule of law. The expectations of communities regarding the
benefits of anti-corruption policies decline if those who commit corrupt
acts are not held accountable.
• If the views or perspectives of a community on corruption are
disregarded, the success of initiatives to prevent it is impacted. Without
focusing on how problems related to corruption affect people’s everyday
lives, projects might be easily hindered.
• Being inclusive and integrating marginalised groups into anti-corruption
projects is a successful way to prevent elite capture and establish
balanced power relations. Organising strong, coherent, and supportive
local power networks out of those who otherwise would have been
barred from decision-making can concentrate capacities and influence.
• In community development programmes, communities are the ultimate
beneficiaries of the outcomes. There is a significant potential in creating
a community that works together upon shared identity and interests.
Through coordination and a unified approach, they can achieve greater
impact.
• In order to be successful, community engagement projects need to
incorporate the building of trust at both interpersonal and institutional
levels. Dialogue to co-create joint solutions and providing feedback on
the impact of citizen input are crucial to maintaining trust and the
willingness to engage.
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Understanding the challenges of
community engagement
The pitfalls of anti-corruption initiatives have been increasingly recognised
as a significant problem. While a wide range of approaches exist to combat
corrupt practices, including initiatives related to broader good governance,
corruption is still with us and more prevalent than ever. At the same time,
the obvious discrepancy between the efforts concentrated on corruption and
the collective capacity to make a real difference has contributed to the
growing apathy and scepticism towards development assistance projects and
anti-corruption programmes.1
To break this vicious circle, democratisation programmes have increased
their support for decentralisation and local initiatives. International bodies
and governments have aimed at prioritising the inherent democratic values
of community, such as belonging and participation, as drivers of their
projects.2 At the same time, the stakeholders also had to recognise that
social context matters more than had previously been anticipated.
Standard project evaluation methods mostly consider social or cultural
dynamics as external, over which project donors and civil society
organisations (CSOs) have limited – or no – control.3 As a result, there is a
growing need to gain proper insight into and address social traditions that
are often seen as the grey area or ‘blind spot’ of community engagement.
Social sciences, and within the science of anthropology, have long offered
explanations on how ‘social context’ works. Corruption is part of an
informal structure, with its own system of accountability. In each
community there are victims and beneficiaries of corruption, and these roles
may shift depending on the circumstances.
Practices that can be formally characterised as corruption are often not seen
as corrupt at all, but as traditional systems of kinship, patron–clientelism, or
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transactions because each involved party gains its own benefits or rewards if
the exchange is carried out in a mutually satisfactory manner, especially in
countries where the elite captures the state and neglects social
accountability.
The purpose of this paper is to shine new light on the major assumptions
about community engagement by connecting it to the social side of
corruption as well as wider anthropological and sociological theories. It
aims to develop an understanding of the challenges in designing and
implementing such programmes.
The mapping of community engagement projects with the help of
anthropology might be useful for two reasons. Firstly, if there is a wide gap
between the views of the donors and communities about the social context
of anti-corruption initiatives, the programmes clearly miss their target.
Secondly, a thorough concept of community and its organisation is needed
to promote collective responsibility, ownership, and trust – all of which are
key for successful engagement.4
The paper begins by introducing the concept of community engagement and
highlights the various types of projects it entails. It will then go on to give
an overview of the benefits, problems, and counterstrategies by analysing
the relevant literature and information gained from practitioners of the
subject. Finally, the conclusion gives a brief summary of the emerging
concepts and solutions by inserting them into the framework of social
accountability.5
Researching the success of community
engagement projects
The research consists of two methodological pillars: desk research,
including literature review; and seven in-depth interviews with renowned
practitioners of the field, including donors, intergovernmental bodies, and
members of civil society organisations. The paper looks at the insights
gained by these respondent experts who have been involved in different
types of community engagement projects. The experts were selected to
4. Mullard 2017.
5. Baez Camargo 2018.
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represent the diversity characterising such programmes that either involve
general community mobilisation for securing rights and influencing policy
change, community engagement in service delivery projects, or goals
combining both aspects.
The study relied on grounded theoretical sampling and theoretical
saturation, moving from case to case and deciding what data to collect to
maximise research opportunities and identify the lessons to be learned. The
interviewees work for intergovernmental bodies, as well as international and
national CSOs. Following the United Nations’ terminology, the latter
category of organisations is understood as non-state, not-for-profit,
voluntary entities formed by people in the social sphere who are separate
from the state and the market.
The respondents live and work on different continents and used different
approaches to implement the initiatives. They were specifically chosen to
expand the scope of data both in respect of its geographical terms and the
experiences derived from their various expertise.
The experts from Kenya and Afghanistan have carried out technical
monitoring of development projects in the more classic sense of community
engagement. While, the interviewees from international organisations and
Romania have focused more on the mobilisation of policies and rights to
tackle corruption. They cooperated with professional communities, as well
as the business sector and media, to implement open government projects or
trainings on public participation.
Semi-structured interviewing allowed enough opportunity and flexibility to
outline their professional experiences and reflect upon them in more detail.
The experts were asked to describe the engagement projects they have
implemented, the successes and obstacles they have faced, and the strategies
they chose to overcome the pitfalls. Then the interview focused on the
characteristics of the communities they have cooperated with, which
community members (typically) participated in the projects, and how they
reached out to them. Some of the questions also aimed at exploring what
factors the respondents have found to be the most crucial for such
programmes to succeed and how those steps were integrated into project
design and implementation.
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The collected data were then analysed and incorporated into the study by
relying on the conceptual framework offered by socio-anthropological
disciplines. This approach has allowed a deeper understanding of the
traditions and patterns of community engagement that determine the success
or failure of anti-corruption policies. The aim of this paper is to bridge the
gap between academic knowledge and policy in the field of anti-corruption
by providing insight as to what can be learned from anthropology to
contribute to the success of anti-corruption interventions.
Defining the concept of community and
identifying the different levels of
engagement
In community engagement projects, the concept of community is built upon
various attributes. In projects run by the World Bank, the term ‘community’
is principally applied to townships and villages, and their inhabitants,
participating in the project.6 In other development programmes, for example
those supported by the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) in the Balkans, specific characteristics such as wealth or poverty,
gender, age, or disability have been used to define local communities or
their specific subsets, including ‘vulnerable groups.’ To make local
governance more authentic and participative, CSOs have been entrusted to
represent the interests of the communities.7
Expert respondents working on monitoring projects have identified
communities based upon the members’ shared interests and benefits
regarding a particular project. In Kenya, the definition of a community
encompassed the people ‘around a particular project.’ For example, if a
school was built, the community was the people who used that school,
including the children who attended and all their relatives.8 In Afghanistan,
a community could be a village or neighbourhood that had a shared interest.
CSOs worked with communities and collectives that shared resources, or
made use of the same services.9
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In more general terms, community engagement is about participation and
empowerment for the common good of a community. Programmes built on
this concept strive for ‘the active, voluntary involvement of individuals and
groups in changing problematic conditions’ in communities to influence ‘the
policies and programs that affect the quality of their lives’ and the lives of
others.10 The concept has its origins in the knowledge acquired since the
participatory development era began in the 1970s.11
Community engagement often overlaps with other democratic concepts,
such as public participation or civic engagement, and covers a broad range
of activities. To provide greater clarity, scholars have proposed different
categorisations:12
1. ‘Community participation’ or ‘community engagement’ includes any
conduct in daily life where the primary aim is not to achieve social
change. Instead, the focus is on informal cultural and entertainment
activities organised by neighbourhood associations, clubs, parent groups,
and other social gatherings. Such projects might also cover community
involvement in project planning, selection, monitoring, and evaluation.
2. ‘Socio-political participation’ is more formal and works towards
common causes and social change. This category covers ‘conventional
political participation’, such as electoral and political campaigning,
which also enforces accountability from elected officials.13
More theoretically, community engagement projects are often perceived as
answers to the collective action theory which aims to replace the
shortcomings of the dominant principal–agent theory in anti-corruption
strategies. The latter concept describes corruption as occurring in a situation
where public officials who have discretion over public services lack
accountability and have the opportunity to commit corrupt practices.
Collective action theorists disagree. They argue that the principal–agent
theory is misguided in its notion that there will be ‘principled principals’ to
stand up against corruption, hold officials accountable, and implement anti-
corruption reforms.14
10. Ohmer and Beck 2006, 180.
11. King and Cruickshank 2010.
12. Moreno-Jiménez et al. 2013; Talò 2017.
13. Marín 2016.
14. Persson et al. 2013; Marquette and Peiffer 2015.
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Instead, they see corruption as a ‘collective action’ where it hardly makes
sense to get involved as the common opinion is: ‘Everybody is corrupt, why
should not I be?’.15 When corruption becomes ‘normal’, communities and
their members are unlikely to abstain from corruption or show willingness
to implement policies or sanctions. The collective action theory brings
attention to the challenges and pitfalls of coordinated anti-corruption
efforts.16
Community engagement aims to override not only
corrupt personal interests, but also the general social
resignation, apathy, and acceptance that surround
corruption.
Community engagement aims to override not only corrupt personal
interests, but also the general social resignation, apathy, and acceptance that
surround corruption. A respondent expert described this challenge:
‘When they say, “Yes, people go to jail, but how does that change my life?”,
we try to convince them that we care about life changing issues.’17
In practice, development work and community engagement projects are
done mainly ‘at the interface between the state and civil society, at the point
where representative and participatory democracy meet’.18 Therefore, it is
often difficult to make theoretical distinctions or set categories for the many
types of tasks and activities such programmes imply. For instance, tools
inspired by the principal–agent theory, such as monitoring and training, still
play a central role in most community engagement projects.
15. Rothstein and Torsello 2013.
16. Marquette and Peiffer 2015.
17. Stefan and Parvu 2019.
18. Hoggett et al. 2008, 15.
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Firstly, donors and governments have found
empowered, community-based citizens more capable
at addressing corruption in the most effective ways.
Secondly, community-focused policies were seen to be
more adept at mobilising citizens against corruption.
Intergovernmental bodies, development agencies, and governments have
supported the engagement of citizens in development strategies to improve
project outcomes and curb corruption.19 The reasons have been twofold.
Firstly, donors and governments have found empowered, community-based
citizens more capable at addressing corruption in the most effective ways.
Secondly, community-focused policies were seen to be more adept at
mobilising citizens against corruption.20
For intergovernmental bodies, such as the World Bank, community
engagement is a development policy tool and a project design and
implementation strategy. It targets poverty and inequality by answering
specific needs based upon decentralised common efforts. For mutual
benefit, ‘effective engagement is necessary across all phases of the
investment project, from the initial mapping, consultations with
communities, and contract negotiations to the establishment of a grievance
mechanism, ongoing community dialogue, and monitoring of both
environmental and social impacts’.21
In community development programmes,
communities are the ultimate beneficiaries of the
outcomes.
In community development programmes, communities are the ultimate
beneficiaries of the outcomes. They are put in charge of designing and
19. Verdenicci & Hough 2015; Marín 2016.
20. Verdenicci & Hough 2015.
21. World Bank 2018, 1.
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implementing the projects funded by the international bodies and different
governments. Through engagement, appropriate training, and support, they
get the incentives to choose, manage, and monitor projects efficiently.22
If we understand technical projects to be at one end of the ‘engagement
spectrum’, then measures that foster social-political participation are at the
other. For example, the Council of Europe (CoE) specifically calls upon its
member states to ‘seek new ways to enhance civic-mindedness’ and
‘promote a culture of democratic participation shared by communities and
local authorities.’ Both aspects of engagement are crucial for anti-corruption
initiatives.
Civil society organisations (CSOs) play a pivotal role in community
engagement. The World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, and the United Nations have all stressed the importance
of partnerships with civil society.23 The United Nations Convention against
Corruption explicitly calls on governments to cooperate with civil society in
tackling corruption.
CSOs have widely been seen as essential forms of social capital, as they are
assumed to incorporate trust, norms, and networks that can improve society
by assisting coordinated actions.24 When developing and implementing anti-
corruption programmes, CSOs are expected to utilise this social capital,
promote democratic skills, and enable political participation and
involvement in own development, thus playing a significant role in reducing
corruption.25
Tools and strategies to encourage
participation
Several types of community engagement mechanisms and tools have been
designed and utilised to counter corruption. This list includes projects
described by the respondent experts and other leading examples. However,
due to the creativity of anti-corruption activists and organisations all over
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Citizen charters
Citizen charters inform citizens about their rights and entitlements as service
users, and the remedies available to them if the standards (time frame and
quality) are not met. Publicly held social audits are monitoring processes
through which communities can collect, analyse, and share organisational or
project-related information. Such charters have been adopted all over the
world. Notably, the World Bank launched the Citizens’ Charter Afghanistan
Project in 2016 to improve the delivery of core infrastructure and social
services to communities through community development councils (CDCs).
Citizen assemblies
Citizens’ assemblies are public engagement tools to promote a culture of
debate and informed decision-making. For example, in Estonia, after a
political corruption scandal in 2012 relating to party financing, the president
convened a People’s Assembly. Firstly, reform proposals were gathered
online, followed by expert analysis and impact assessments. Secondly,
people’s suggestions were grouped into priority areas that were deliberated
over in dedicated thematic roundtables. Finally, a randomly selected group
of citizens were brought together to consider and decide which proposals
were to be tabled to parliament. As a result, the country reformed party
financing and created a permanent mechanism for citizen initiatives. A law
now states that if 1,000 people support a certain topic on a designated
platform, the parliament is obliged to take that onto its agenda.26
Community report cards
Community report cards (or scorecards) assess projects and government
performance by analysing qualitative data collected from focus group
discussions with community members. Citizens are trained to rate the
quality of public services, such as trash collection, access to water, or the
quality of education. Ideally, the government then responds to gaps in
service delivery, and the citizens report back on the government’s measures.
The National Taxpayers Association in Kenya developed the Citizen Report
Cards (CRCs) as social accountability tools to support citizen engagement
in relation to the management of public funds and government service
26. Varga 2019.
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delivery.27 The Kenyan mechanism was created from the tool developed by
the Public Affairs Centre in Bangalore City, which assessed the quality of
public services in Southern India.
Participatory budgeting
Through participatory budgeting, citizens participate directly in the related
decision-making process and budget execution.28 Projects supporting public
decision-making and budget monitoring have become popular all over the
world. For example, the city of Madrid runs Decide Madrid, where citizens
receive feedback on their input from their peers as well as the city. Their
proposals can be tracked, and the city even has a dedicated budget for these
publicly designed and supported developments.29
Open data programmes
Open data programmes are developed to encourage communities to use data
to tackle problems, represent interests, advocate, or hold local governments
accountable.30 In the United States, the socalled Tactical Data Engagement
framework by Sunlight Foundation has been designed to catalyse open
data’s use for problem-solving by going beyond merely publishing data,
policies, and portals.
Integrity pacts
Transparency International’s (TI) Integrity Pacts rely on written agreements
between the government and private bidders to refrain from bribery and
collusion during public procurement procedures. Such projects operate an
independent monitoring system by civil society. Integrity Pacts have been
applied in more than 15 countries and 300 separate situations.31
27. Napisa 2019.
28. Baez Camargo 2018.
29. Varga 2019.
30. Sturgill 2019.
31. Transparency International 2019; Marquette and Peiffer 2015.
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The benefits of community engagement
projects
Community engagement projects are developing in different shapes and
sizes, and practitioners, CSOs, and donors report of positive experiences
being gained on the ground. According to the respondent experts, such
notable benefits include:
Social basis for anti-corruption work
Community engagement initiatives create a solid social basis for anti-
corruption work. No project is sustainable without reaching the
constituency. Increasing the constituency also means taking the time to
involve people and educate them so they can act later on as an agent of
change in their own communities.32
Community engagement initiatives create a solid
social basis for anti-corruption work.
Broader spectrum of remedies
Community engagement provides a broader spectrum of possible remedies
and public control over solving common problems. It is often more
important to infuse anti-corruption elements into public service delivery
projects than to focus on anti-corruption as a singular issue.
If, for example, construction projects are designed together with citizens, it
is less likely that corruption will occur during their implementation. This is
due to the inherent openness of authorities to involve the public, and
promote enhanced public ownership and the benefits that arise from it.33
Such sense of ownership also provides more sustainability. Community
members are more likely to continue using and maintaining the project
products from their own resources, because they care for them.34
32. Stefan and Parvu 2019.
33. Varga 2019.
34. Napisa 2019.
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Authenticity and legitimacy
Community engagement builds authenticity and legitimacy for the projects.
Getting local people involved provides more authentic information and adds
legitimacy to a project. Communities are the ones who really know what is
happening.35
Connecting activists
Community engagement projects connect isolated activists. Anti-corruption
activists are often alone with no support. Community engagement creates an
environment where community members can feel confident in expressing
their concerns. Building a network of people who think alike, and bringing
them together from time to time, may produce ‘extraordinary feedback’.36
Improve service delivery
Community engagement projects improve the quality of service delivery.
Through community engagement, the quality of the projects and services
can improve significantly. For example, Integrity Watch Afghanistan, which
carries out community-based monitoring of construction, education, and
court operation in the country, has monitored 12,066 projects since starting
its work in 2006. According to their statistics, the rate of solved problems
compared to the number of problems they have identified up until recently
is 78%.37
Increased accountability
Community engagement increases the accountability of public authorities
and service delivery companies. Community engagement projects may
ensure that government and other service providers (including contractors)
are accountable to the public, and that the community has a voice against
corruption and prevents it whenever it can.38
35. Földes 2019.
36. Stefan and Parvu 2019.
37. Afzali 2019.
38. Afzali 2019.
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Problematic elements of the community
engagement concept
Intergovernmental bodies and international CSOs have put community
engagement at the forefront of their initiatives. For example, with regard to
urban law enforcement the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC) stresses that ‘engagement, communication and
participation of all the relevant local stakeholders remain among the most
important tools for city officials to foster inclusive, resilient and law-abiding
societies.’
In principle, anti-corruption policies denote an ethical, reflexive, and
socially responsive approach. They should motivate interaction between
policymakers and communities, and be created to understand and respond to
their needs, views, and expectations.39
In reality, anti-corruption initiatives and community engagement projects, as
they seek to ensure that assistance is not misused by those with power and
influence, often face serious challenges and pitfalls. According to AidData
and The Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations,
when it comes to turning policies and regulations into actual steps and
measures ‘anti-corruption stands apart as the policy domain with highest
level of (net) domestic opposition to reform and the worst track record of
reform implementation’.40
In some countries with a high level of corruption, the problem became even
more exposed while the initiatives aiming to curb it were being
implemented. Approaches based on the collective action theory were
described as having failed for several reasons. If the authorities imposed
rules without effective monitoring and sanctioning, the measures did not
transform to generally recognised social norms. More likely, they became
attractive to those wishing to deceive because of the relative low risk of
being caught. Increased transparency also revealed more corruption. On the
one hand, this made people even more aware of the problem; on the other, it
opened the door for yet more non-corrupt actors to take part in corrupt
practices.41
39. Johnston 2018.
40. AidData 2015, 13.
41. Persson et al. 2013.
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Since the 1990s the support offered by civil society was seen as essential in
boosting social demand for anti-corruption measures and good governance.
However, recently this type of support has become the subject of serious
public debate and organisations find themselves facing serious integrity
challenges.42 Alongside disenchantment with the principle of transparency
and scandal fatigue, a certain level of scepticism regarding civil society and
international bodies developed.43 Most of these issues have found their way
into the populist narrative, questioning their legitimacy.44
This trend continues despite the billions of dollars invested in anti-
corruption programmes.45 Though tackling corruption has become an
‘industry’ in its own right,46 the related community engagement
programmes, according to previous studies, mostly fail for the same wrongs
they aim to tackle in the first place:
Corruption and elite capture of the projects
Corruption can become part of the project culture because of, among others,
lack of information, poor training about the rights of participants, and weak
ability to choose tasks and leaders, or monitor staff and those in charge and
to blow the whistle about irregularities. Programmes become particularly
prone to corruption if they are coerced by the project implementers who
utilise them for their private interest.
For example, in Kenya’s Arid Lands Resource Management Project
(1996–2010) it was shown that only a handful of carefully selected people
actually benefited from the funds provided by the development programme.
Most of the beneficiaries were either community development council
officials or people associated with them. In each of the participating
communities almost all of the funds were embezzled.47
‘Design-reality gaps’ between expectations and on-the-ground
realities
As Heeks and Mathisen underline,
42. Heeks and Mathisen 2012.
43. Okolloh 2019.
44. Brechenmacher and Carothers 2018.
45. Marquette and Peiffer 2015.
46. Sampson 2017.
47. Ensminger 2017.
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‘All anti-corruption designs contain within them an inscribed “world-in-
miniature” which we may call requirements or assumptions or expectations
about the context into which the initiative is going to be deployed. This
includes inscriptions about the technology that will be available; about the
values that people will have; about organizational culture; about work
processes and structures; and so forth.’48
If the gap between the perceptions of the designer and the world of the users
is too wide, the project is heading for a fall.
Lack of understanding of local power structures
For example, in Uganda a study showed that the motives of individual
actors are often influenced by the interests of the social groups to which
they belong, as well as patronage based on kinship and community origin.
For external actors aiming to implement reform policies such complex
networks are almost impossible to map.49
Co-optation risks
Anti-corruption mechanisms focusing on citizen engagement can lose
direction or be abused easily. In such cases, political or personal agendas
undermine the public interest in order to achieve personal gain.50 When
public budgeting was introduced in São Paulo, the government co-opted the
project to legitimate its own policies, as the ‘participatory decision-making
process was grafted onto an existing political-spoils system’.51
Induced citizen engagement
Sole reliance on induced community engagement might not result in
successful projects, since it is unlikely to build long-lasting cohesion at the
community level. Similar types of people tend to form groups with one
another; thus programmes do not strengthen cross-group cohesion.52
Lack of inclusion erodes engagement
If the attention paid to the mechanisms involving marginalised groups is
insufficient, as was shown in the case of engagement projects in Australia,
48. Heeks and Mathisen 2012, 541.
49. Fjeldstad 2006.
50. Verdenicci and Hough 2015.
51. Wampler 2010, 189.
52. Mansuri and Vao 2013.
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the project is no more than a one-way instrument to put through the
government’s agenda without real conversation. Similarly, labelling
previously used consultation and information processes as ‘community
engagement projects’ hollows out the concept.53
Practitioners and CSO experts who participated in the interviews have
encountered several other problems during the implementation of
community engagement projects:
Mindset: pessimism, scepticism, and radicalism
Regardless of their geographical location, many community members
seemed to feel that themes related to corruption were highly sensitive and
contradicting. Generally, experts distinguished three groups within
communities. The first consisted of those who were motivated to be active,
because it would lead to improvement. The second group was very sceptical
about the things that could be changed, and the third group consisted of
those people who refused to engage.54
People also came with a limited, but radicalised, knowledge that was
heavily influenced by the media and politics. In Romania, CSOs had
difficult times in challenging the mindsets and flawed information shared by
some communities, and in opening a balanced discussion.55 In Afghanistan,
community engagement specialists had to overcome the general pessimism
– people thinking there is no point in doing anything or contributing to
community interest as nothing is going to change.56
Power asymmetry within communities
When monitoring community engagement projects in Afghanistan, the
implementers had to pay careful attention to ensure that community
representatives did not speak just for a certain individual or a group that
dominated the whole community.57
In Kenya, some community leaders, on occasions, did not want their
projects to be assessed. So they would mobilise citizens to hinder the project
monitoring. Exerting their power, they issued threats to scare away people
53. King and Cruickshank 2010.
54. Hrvolova 2019.
55. Stefan and Parvu 2019.
56. Afzali 2019.
57. Afzali 2019.
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who volunteered to carry out monitoring tasks, or made community
members write reports that were not accurate. Reports were also falsified to
damage the reputation of the monitoring organisation. Even if, despite the
obstacles, truthful reports were drafted, some leaders did everything they
could to stop their publication.58
Powerful landlords, community power holders, and aggressive local
officials have, in some cases, also tried to make it difficult to implement
community engagement projects in Romania.59
Insecurity
In certain geographical areas, such as Afghanistan, insecurity counts as one
of the major problems of community engagement projects. The respondent
CSO was only able to go to secure areas where it was safe to work with the
community.60
Lack of meaningful connections and trust between project
implementers and communities
If the views or perspectives of a community are disregarded, it can become
unapproachable. Without focusing on how problems related to corruption
affect people’s everyday lives and highlighting the connections, projects
might be derailed easily.61 In some communities in Kenya, people had to be
educated that the money that had been used in construction projects actually
came from their own pockets. After it was explained how the state budget
and tax system worked, they understood that it was their money which was
being used and the reason why they needed to engage.62
Finding the right connections and communicating effectively were crucial.
Frequent causes of unsuccessful projects are the lack of cooperation from
local CSOs, no knowledge of the local language, and difficulties in
identifying the right authorities and officials to involve.63
58. Napisa 2019.
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The ‘usual suspects’ problem
CSOs regularly face the problem that there are only some people in local
communities who want to get involved in their projects, and quite often
other CSOs already work with those people.64 It is always easier to engage
with those community members who are interested in such projects,
especially if the topic is difficult to understand. According to the experts’
experiences, project participants tend to be more affluent and educated
citizens, who are often better informed or aware of why and how corruption
erodes public trust and undermines welfare. Therefore, the more difficult
challenge is how to engage those who live under less affluent conditions or
are otherwise disadvantaged, especially as corruption affects them more
severely.65
Missing capacities within the community
Community engagement focuses on teaching locals how to use the tools and
knowledge that are already at their disposal against corruption and bad
governance. However, training needed to be redesigned when basic
capacities, such as computer literacy, were missing. As a Romanian expert
described it, ‘We’ve had the expectation that we go there and tell them
technical things about what public procurement looks like and how you look
at political financing, but they did not know how to use Excel’.66
Lack of access to information
Initially, in both Kenya and Afghanistan, restricted access to information
was a key obstacle to project implementation. In Kenya, community
engagement experts have often faced double standards when being provided
with project documentation. For example, papers they received from the
authorities were different from the official project description that state
bodies worked with.67 In Afghanistan, the situation improved significantly
after the Access to Information Law was passed in 2014.68
Inadequate implementation and sustainability of policies and laws
Publishing information, creating databases, making data open, and adopting
a law on freedom of information are all crucial steps, but they may not be
64. Stefan and Parvu 2019.
65. Varga 2019.
66. Stefan and Parvu 2019.
67. Napisa 2019.
68. Afzali 2019.
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sufficient. According to the respondent experts, these will not necessarily
encourage people to get involved and start using the information.69
Similarly, the experts found it problematic that policymakers and project
designers tend to think that once a law or a measure is adopted, or an
institution is created, it takes care of itself; in reality, it does not happen like
that.70
In Kenya, undermining sustainability happened at a more personal level.
After presenting the results of the projects, some community leaders wanted
to withdraw the revealing reports and destroy them before many people
could read and understand them – pretending that the project never
happened.71
Lack of feedback
Closely connected to sustainability, deficient feedback to communities was
found to be a significant pitfall of such projects. As a respondent expert
emphasised,
‘We’ve seen countless of times that people do get excited and take part in
community engagement projects only to see that very little happens in the
end and the government does not even tell them why. This is a recipe to lead
to consultation fatigue or a complete loss of interest.’72
The limits of local actions
Grand corruption and captured states create specific obstacles for
community engagement projects. If corrupt practices become systemic,
sporadic local initiatives are unlikely to provide a comprehensive solution.
As a respondent expert argued,
‘It’s like having pneumonia and using topical antibiotics on the skin of your
hand. Local collective actions are important complementary tools to push
for and maintain change, but there is always a risk of relapse.’73
69. Varga 2019.








Though the experts’ answers accentuate their personal dilemmas in light of
the specific social and political contexts they work in, the issues presented
also epitomise the challenges that anti-corruption practitioners and
community engagement specialists face on a daily basis all over the world.
The concept of corruption and the definition
dilemma
Corruption, in very general terms, might be defined as the act of giving and
receiving advantage in illegitimate or exploitative contexts. According to
Transparency International’s rather pragmatic approach, it is the abuse of
entrusted power for private gain. It can be classified as grand, petty, and
political, depending on the amounts of money lost and the sector where it
occurs. In many traditional cultures and a rising number of politically
captured states, relationships and exchanges based on the advantage or gain
have been or become the source of power.74
Anthropologists have long emphasised that the definition of corruption is
community dependent. Some authors have defined concerned acts and
customs as ‘naturalised’ or ‘legalised’ corruption. Applying the already
established international definitions of corruption to the local context, they
perceived such practices as exemptions from moral and legal responsibility.
For example in former communist countries, such as Romania, corruption
was described as a legitimised everyday game of exchanges that everybody
played in an unregulated public sphere with personalised tactics for short-
term benefits and disregard for the long-term social and political
consequences.75
Other researchers, rather than considering the Western notion of corruption,
showed that traditional communities in different parts of the world had
always been aware of what was corrupt and not, but in their own terms. In
the Pacific region, communities had their own perception about what
corruption entails and it depended on whether a relationship was being
74. Findlay 2007.
75. Rivkin-Fish 2005; Zerelli 2005; Sedlenieks 2004.
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exercised for a legitimate purpose or for a corrupt context of domination and
obligation.76 Consequently, the success of anti-corruption strategies was
determined by the legitimacy of any distinction made within the community
and how community members evaluated their own practices.77
Furthermore, in countries under political transition or in turmoil, finding
their own values has been particularly relevant if social structures and the
legal system were in a constant flux. Where ‘official’ norms and policies
have been changing persistently, communities were keen to find stability
and reliability in their mutually shared norms and personal relations, which
they never considered to be corrupt.78
The community’s approach to the concept of corruption has very much
shaped community engagement projects as well. In Romania, the challenge
was that people tended to include much more in the definition of corruption
‘than there actually was’.79 Therefore, there is the risk of corruption
becoming an undistinguishable target and a catch-all term to cover virtually
any negative or ‘unjust’ behaviour.80
In line with the findings about naturalised corruption, in some Central and
Eastern European countries potential project stakeholders admitted that, for
them, corruption was just a way of doing business. Therefore, they were not
willing to engage with civil society on the issues of democracy, rule of law,
and governance.81 In Afghanistan, there have been some prevalent norms
within society – such as helping each other’s relatives or bonds within
community – that sometimes resulted in ignoring corruption, or even in
undertaking corrupt practices.82
Interestingly, regardless of geography, the respondent experts have
overcome the definition dilemma by elevating community engagement
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‘You do not fight corruption by fighting corruption, it is often not even
necessary to put the “corruption” label on projects, letting it enter the
discourse.’83
In Romania, projects were deliberately not oriented towards only corruption,
but also the wider concept of bad governance.84 In Afghanistan, corruption
was seen as a risk of external contractors restricting community interest, and
therefore not a problem within communities. By focusing on communities
instead of individuals and electing representatives to stand for their interests
in dedicated community councils, they reduced the chances of misuses by
powerful individuals, because the whole community was mobilised.85
What makes and breaks community engagement:
the sense of ownership
Locality or the common use of public services were only some of the factors
that constructed communities in engagement projects, but what determined
the initiatives’ success were shared interests. Social sciences have
emphasised that communities represent a broader relationship of solidarity
over individual self-interests by sharing both benefits and misfortunes.86
The feeling of solidarity, as well as identity, comes from a sense of
belonging and, in the case of the projects in question, ownership.87
As the Kenyan expert explained, people participated and continued to use
the project products because they experienced a sense of ownership.
‘People were able to say, “This is our project and we take the right project
after it has been implemented.” They continued to use the schools and
hospitals and run them from their own resources, because they felt they were
theirs.’88
The sense of ownership does not come automatically. It rests on a rationally
motivated adjustment of interests or a similarly motivated rational
83. Varga 2019.
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agreement upon mutual consent.89 According to the practitioners, in
community engagement projects the sense of ownership could be increased
through several steps. First and foremost, as an expert underlined,
‘If you can get a shared understanding with the local community what the
problem is, if there is actually a problem, and people can see the problem,
then you can try to figure out a solution.’90
Another respondent pointed out that projects need to embrace issues that
directly affect people’s lives, providing assistance to use public information
in more effective ways, showing results, and giving coherent feedback.91
The role of the CSOs in that process was twofold. Firstly, they had to guide
and educate the communities to arrive at a common and informed decision
without actually taking charge.
‘We give capacity to these people to work on their own. The main task is
making them do the job.’92
Secondly, in many cases they were translators of national or international
polices and laws who trained communities about corruption, bad
governance, and related rights and obligations.
Solutions to corruption practices are often highly complex and technical.93
Translation of the multiple and fluid policies had to be done in an authentic,
comprehensible, and reflexive manner, so that communities could apply the
knowledge to their local context and make the best use of it.94 In this way
the experts and CSOs could avoid communities considering democratic
policies as elitist, morally suspect, or disempowering.95
Technology and social media have expanded the role and tasks of CSOs as
translators. Beyond giving training about the relevant laws and policies,
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to understand and filter populist rhetoric and misinformation campaigns
built around the anti-corruption agenda.96
Creating communities through engagement
Taking a step further, many anti-corruption projects have created and
engaged their own specialised communities. As a Romanian expert
emphasised, ‘You are creating communities of transformers. Local
communities are there, but a community of people who are changing
communities is not a given. Those communities do not exist’.97 The
examples given by the respondents have been diverse. To achieve tangible
impact, teachers in Romania have been trained in so-called Democracy
Schools to engage in local community issues and use the democratic tools
that are available to demand change.
On an international level, Transparency International has built a partnership
called Global Anti-Corruption Consortium with the professional community
of journalists of the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project. TI
and the investigative journalists work together regardless of location. In
each case, five or more nationalities collaborate to put together the pieces of
the story. Small cases might need four to five journalists, while medium-
sized and larger ones need more resources. For example, investigating
Golden Visa cases involved 20 to 25 media outlets from 15 to 20 countries,
and the case of the Panama Papers scandal required 200 people to work
together.98
A community that works together upon shared
identity and interests, and through coordination and a
unified approach, can achieve greater impact.
The Center for International Private Enterprise has been cooperating with
local partners to engage businesses in supporting civil society to realise its
democratic efforts. It has also strived to create a community that works
96. Stefan and Parvu 2019.
97. Stefan and Parvu 2019.
98. Földes 2019.
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together upon shared interests because through coordination and unified
approach, they could achieve greater impact.99
These projects, of course, represent only the tip of the iceberg in terms of
the many types of community engagement projects aiming to tackle
corruption. At the same time, they also show that constructing communities
can be just as effective as working with existing ones. There is a significant
potential in generating trust and cooperation, and building sustainable
communities out of professional or social networks upon shared identity and
interests.
Harnessing inclusion to tackle the ‘usual suspects’
problem and elite capture
Research suggests that in community-driven anti-corruption projects,
participants are wealthier, are better educated, and hold a higher social
status. They are also better connected through families, peer groups, and
networks.100 This may be due to the fact that community members with
higher incomes are likely to be more invested in community stability and
sustainability. Therefore they are keener to engage in professional local
planning and development.101
Empowered, community-based citizens are more
capable at addressing corruption in the most effective
ways, and community-focused policies are more likely
to mobilise citizens against corruption.
In the chain of ‘usual suspects’, international donors mostly choose trusted
CSOs that have already proved their competence; while national CSOs often
work with the same contacts at a local level.
99. Hrvolova 2019.
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‘If they are reputable, they are more likely than other informal or emerging
networks to gain trust.’102
According to anthropological findings, CSOs are in definite need of support
as their employees and activists participating in such projects typically come
from the middle classes that concentrate educational, cultural, and social
capital but usually lack economic resources or power of their own. On the
one hand, they are committed to social progress as a fundamental, but non-
material, value of their work. On the other, due to the financial dependency,
they are forced to address the changing priorities of donors. This often leads
to donor-driven agendahopping.103
These generalised characteristics of the project participants have two
ramifications. Firstly, even if community engagement projects are designed
to be inclusive, in reality there is a high risk that they result in elite capture.
Inequality within communities weakens the ability of many members to
contribute to such programmes.104 Furthermore, if the network that the
project participants form and rely on is exclusive and focuses on the
interests of its members instead of the whole community, investments
supporting civic engagement may not have the desired effect.105
Secondly, if successful, anti-corruption measures may eliminate significant
informal income, thus creating winners and losers at both ends of society.106
This often-forgotten context makes anti-corruption projects unique and, at
the same time, highly sensitive among community engagement initiatives.
The level of participation, and subsequently the success of the programmes,
clearly depends on both the short- and long-term prospects of community
members with very different social standings.
To overcome those problems, the respondent experts have highlighted the
importance of paying particular attention to inclusion during the
implementation of community engagement projects. In Afghanistan, while
each project begins with reaching out to the local community development
council, CSO experts also try to include representatives of the broader
community, such as youth councils or marginalised people who do not have
102. Hrvolova 2019.
103. Mikuš 2017.
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a voice in the existing structure. They are present at the event where the
volunteer community representatives tasked with monitoring the process are
introduced. They make sure that the election is transparent and the whole
community agrees with the decision.107
Inclusion has denoted the importance of balanced participation in terms of
both gender and age. In Kenya, the respondent expert found that it was
mostly women who engaged in the projects related to water and health
facilities, as ‘men did not understand the challenges of those facilities that
women understood’.108 Though young people were more reluctant to take
part, when they did get involved, the projects also had a stronger echo
through local assemblies and demonstrations.109
The involvement of young people has produced considerable results in other
parts of the world as well. For instance, in Italy the government decided to
make the data on one million projects and 100 billion euros worth of
funding from European Union Cohesion Funds available online. In addition
to many other projects, a school programme called A Scuola di
OpenCoesione was launched. A network of schools was created that trained
thousands of students on how to use the information to monitor completion
of investments in their very own schoolyards or neighbourhoods.110
European examples showed that, in aging societies, engaging elderly and
pensioner communities through innovative projects has helped them to fight
abusive power that was relevant to their own lives.111
Power relations and government support
Communities do not exist in a political or economic vacuum; they are
connected through various links to the larger society and the state.112
Therefore, power relations within the community and society at large, as
well as the attitude of the authorities, have a decisive impact on the outcome
of community engagement projects. As the primary aim of community
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official support is lacking then efforts might become limited, even
irrelevant, or in some cases counterproductive.113
If we understand ‘local’ to be the proximity to decision makers and the
capacity to influence decisions on priorities regarding the use of public or
international development support, we also have to recognise the potential
negative consequences such closeness entails for participating in anti-
corruption projects. As an expert noted regarding local businesses:
‘They are typically more vested [in the programmes], they have more
interest in local democratic governance, but they can be at a greater risk of
being affected by certain actions of local governments.’114
In terms of power relations, the situation becomes even more complex in
captured states and areas severely affected by globalisation. State capture
and the overt use of power present an evident risk for anti-corruption
programmes. If elites, or powerful state or local leaders, exploit the existing
legal and social order for their own benefits, corruption becomes one of the
main threats to the rule of law.115
At the same time, a matter of growing concern to both scholars and
practitioners is the extent to which public interest can be realised under
conditions of corporate and financial globalisation and their local
consequences.116 A respondent expert shared the following negative
example:
‘If a local community is affected by globalization, for example, by
multinational companies that outpace local suppliers and take the profit
away, then corruption might be the only protecting mechanism for a
community to make sure that the local contracts go to local suppliers who
will actually spend the profit within the community.’117
While decentralisation is at the core of community engagement, studies see
an emerging risk of over-delegating tasks and competences, which may
result in reverse democratic accountability. In this case, communities
113. Verdenicci & Hough 2015.
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implement state tasks, while being accountable ‘for sorting out the social
consequences of economic conditions which are entirely beyond their
control’.118
When monitoring development projects in Kenya and Afghanistan,
communities were chosen from a list produced by the government of the
initiatives that had been implemented in a particular province or region.
Then the communities were screened in terms of their willingness to
participate and, in the case of Afghanistan, security.119
Looking at projects in Kenya through the lens of social sciences, power had
both positive and negative impact on their.120 The expert CSO was
strategically aiming to establish good relationships with the authorities from
the local level up to the national level. When the leadership supported their
work, it was significantly easier to engage communities since the members
took the projects more seriously. Therefore, when leaders were asked to tell
community members to attend the weekly meetings, they made concrete and
visible decisions with explicit messages in support of the initiatives.
However, some leaders were far less enthusiastic about being screened and
monitored, so tried to mobilise people against the projects or make the final
project reports disappear through more obscure channels.121 This hidden
control over (non)decision-making was an equally potent form of asserting
power that could decide the fate of the programme.
In Romania, the respondent experts were choosing challenging locations in
terms of power relations to fill certain gaps or power vacuums. In some
cases, they went to localities where no other programmes were running or
not much happened in general. For a project about clientelism, they engaged
in regions which were more affected, or with communities where they knew
that there were no opposition to holding local leaders accountable and there
was a need to engage.122
To establish balance over power asymmetries the experts applied different
approaches:
118. Shaw 2011, ii136.
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• Inclusion. Being inclusive and deliberately integrating less powerful
groups within communities into the projects was a successful way to
reduce over-domination. Organising strong, coherent, and supportive
local power networks from those who would otherwise have been barred
from decision-making was a way to concentrate capacities and
influence.123
• Access to information. Freedom of information measures brought about
systematic shifts in power relationships, especially regarding the hidden
dimension of opaque decision-making. In Afghanistan, one of the most
important achievements of the programme was that access to
information became an accepted norm in many parts of the country.
Subsequently, contractors could no longer refuse to provide information.
If they failed to deliver the requested information, the government was
obliged to enable access to the documents.124
• Technology. Simple technological developments, such as mobile phone
applications that enabled citizens to monitor government infrastructure
projects, could be instrumental to the success of the project. People
could report via their phones whether projects had indeed been
completed. In Kenya, technology tracked the exact time when the
community members had reported, so project team members could
interact with them immediately to get accurate information. Such
efficiency contributed to preventing corruption, as potential perpetrators
could be caught at any time.125
In community engagement projects targeting corruption, it was elaborate
feedback mechanisms that made a real difference.126 In Kenya, technology
enabled the storing of information for a longer period of time and the ability
to publish reports to connect with wider audiences, especially young people
who were participating less in the projects.127
The role of trust
Community engagement does not work without trust. As an expert
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and can build power and legitimacy. Without trust it makes no sense to
engage, because words, commitments have no weight’.128
Community engagement does not work without trust.
According to sociological studies, trust implies two levels of interpretation:
the construction of trustworthiness and the action of trust itself.129 Very
simply, trustworthiness establishes trust.130 Practical experiences have
supported this theoretical premise. As an expert respondent described:
‘Trust is important, especially because when CSOs from the country capitols
come into the countryside wanting to do work there, they are faced with
scepticism. People ask questions: Who are these people? What is their
motivation? Why are they doing it? This all goes back to the underlying
question: does or would the anti-corruption work undermine community
cohesion? Thus, you need trust, but you also have to be trustworthy. One
way to overcome this is to enable local actors, listen to them about their
needs, and provide them with adequate support instead of telling them what
to do.’131
In order to be successful, community engagement projects need to
strategically incorporate and maintain trust at both interpersonal and
institutional levels in various relationships. Accordingly, trust should
constitute the relations between:
• CSOs and community members
• CSOs and community leaders
• CSOs and authorities
• Community members and their leaders
• Community members and fellow community members
Ideally, these relations form a chain of trust during the implementation of
the project. However, one of the most critical pitfalls of community
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these interactions, mistrust prevails and suspicion hinders making the
decision to engage in common action, the whole project is in jeopardy.
Though projects are able to engage community members despite the
resistance of, for example, the authorities, project participants usually need
to invest much more effort, time, and financial sources to produce
successful outcomes.
The chain of trust is fragile and can break easily, even in situations that
seem to be ideal for community engagement projects. Studies warn that
where members are particularly committed to their communities, high levels
of trust may create equally high expectations towards their leaders.132
Losing trust in state-level leaders as well as local leaders undermines the
legitimacy of their initiatives. The expectations of communities regarding
anti-corruption policies and their benefits decline if those who commit
corruption are not held accountable for their actions.133 Practitioners found
that often it is the state that does not trust its citizens, which might further
undermine legitimacy of the programmes.134
The preconditions to creating trust are confidence and dispositions that
allow community members to take the risk and participate in the project.135
As the Kenyan expert emphasised:
‘Trust between us and the community was about delivering what we have
promised. For example, we promised the community that we would try and
get them the right information, and we approached the authority to get that
information and give them to those communities.’136
In this case, the CSO has demonstrated its trustworthiness by fulfilling the
community’s expectations and showing it will be able to do so in the course
of the whole project.
Trust within communities has ultimately been bound up with the feeling of
self-belief. In Afghani communities where scepticism and apathy prevailed,
gaining self-belief was a trigger to take the risk and step up against
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problems affecting their lives. Self-belief denoted that they could take action
against corruption and expect results in exchange.137
In Romania, enthusiasm was identified as the trigger feeling that was vital
for the projects to succeed, and was defined as ‘really caring about the topic
and wanting to do something about it’ – despite the pressure put on
community members.138
The respondent experts have identified two distinctive means to gain and
reinforce trust within communities and for the projects:
• Dialogue. Dialogue to co-create joint solutions on how to address
corruption was seen as a main contributing factor to building trust. In
practice, dialogue was a continuous mutual learning process about
needs, expectations, and concerns, which factored all of these elements
into their final decision-making.139
• Feedback. Providing feedback on the impact of citizen input, as well as
telling participants why their proposals may not have been taken on
board, was suggested to be crucial to maintaining trust and the
willingness to engage, as it showed people their participation was not in
vain.140
Conclusion: The lessons learned
Hinting at the diverse characteristics of communities and the projects, a
Romanian expert noted, ‘There is no rulebook for community
engagement.’141 However, as the findings of this paper have shown, despite
the geographical, cultural, and social differences, not only were the
problems and pitfalls of community engagement projects strikingly similar,
but so were the methods that experts have chosen to overcome them.
All respondent experts have decided, in their own way, to focus on context
and social reality over theory and pre-set corruption definitions to make the
projects successful. They have recognised and engaged with the real social
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and political dynamics, but without judging whether corruption is ‘normal’
or not.
If we organise their solutions into the main building blocks of social
accountability which relate to successful anti-corruption initiatives, we get a
comprehensive set of the tools and responsibilities of the concerned project
parties.142
Voice
Generating and articulating citizens’ voices are vital elements of successful
social accountability initiatives to counter corruption. Trust, the sense of
ownership, and inclusion create and strengthen participation by enabling
community members to express their preferences, opinions, and views, and
demand accountability from power holders.
Trust has to be gained and continuously maintained among all actors of the
projects by proving trustworthiness. Their relationships and interactions
with each other constitute a chain of trust in which the links depend on each
other. If trust prevails through meaningful connections, community
members will take the risk to speak up and act against corrupt practices.
Building up a solid sense of ownership regarding the projects is a
fundamental task. It requires the motivated adjustment of shared interests
within the community with the help of CSOs as competent translators of
laws, policies, and projects, as well as capacities to filter misinformation.
This undertaking does not necessarily need to be overly complex. If
communities are involved right from the start of a project and are allowed to
decide on the different types of assistance and engagement needed, the
adjustment becomes significantly easier.
Inclusion denotes making special efforts to involve community members
beyond the ‘usual suspects’ and activists, such as women, young and elderly
people, and members of vulnerable groups, which will provide equal
chances and stakes in common decisions. Breaking away from the classic
concept of communities tied to locality, and expanding the notion to
professional networks and other types of organisations formed upon shared
interests, might open up new opportunities for anti-corruption engagement.
142. Baez Camargo 2018.
U 4  I S S U E  2 0 2 0 : 3
34
Enforceability and risk management
Anti-corruption programmes often focus on risk prevention and the
enforcement of sanctions. According to the lessons of the interviews,
sustainability and balanced power relations play a pivotal role in the success
of such projects. The initiatives rely on longer-term commitments from the
project actors, while community members expect sustainable outcomes
which do not end with adopting risk prevention mechanisms, policies,
reports, or sanctions. Without adequate laws that enable access to
information, hidden political decisions affect the implementation of the
projects.
Answerability
In successful projects, it is not only the public authorities that need to be
answerable. The focus should shift to the importance of feedback which
incorporates the exchanges and dialogues between citizens and state bodies,
as well as communication between community members and CSOs.
Technology can simplify such interactions and make them more efficient at
the same time.
To build lasting relationships for sustainable social
benefits and outcomes, community engagement
strategies need to be tailored to their target groups
and their perception of corruption.
To build lasting relationships for sustainable social benefits and outcomes,
community engagement strategies need to be tailored to their target groups
and their perception of corruption. The specificities and dynamics of the
communities should be integral elements of all stages of the project
implementation process, including decision‐making and the design,
governance, and delivery of anti-corruption initiatives.
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